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The nonlocal behavior of quantum mechanics can be used to generate guaranteed fresh randomness from
an untrusted device that consists of two nonsignalling components; since the generation process requires some
initial fresh randomness to act as a catalyst, one also speaks of randomness expansion. R. Colbeck and A. Kent
[J. Phys. A 44, 095305 (2011)] proposed the first method for generating randomness from untrusted devices, but
without providing a rigorous analysis. This was addressed subsequently by S. Pironio et al. [Nature (London)
464, 1021 (2010)], who aimed at deriving a lower bound on the min-entropy of the data extracted from an
untrusted device based only on the observed nonlocal behavior of the device. Although that article succeeded in
developing important tools for reaching the stated goal, the proof itself contained a bug, and the given formal
claim on the guaranteed amount of min-entropy needs to be revisited. In this paper we build on the tools provided
by Pironio et al. and obtain a meaningful lower bound on the min-entropy of the data produced by an untrusted
device based on the observed nonlocal behavior of the device. Our main result confirms the essence of the
(improperly formulated) claims of Pironio et al. and puts them on solid ground. We also address the question
of composability and show that different untrusted devices can be composed in an alternating manner under
the assumption that they are not entangled. This enables superpolynomial randomness expansion based on two
untrusted yet unentangled devices.
DOI: 10.1103/PhysRevA.87.012335 PACS number(s): 03.67.Dd, 03.65.Ud
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Background
One of the counterintuitive features of quantum mechanics
is its nonlocality: measuring possibly far apart quantum
systems in randomly selected bases (chosen out of some given
class) may lead to correlations that are impossible to obtain
classically. Anticipated by Einstein, Rosen, and Podolsky [1],
it was Bell [2] who put this property on firm ground by
proposing an inequality that is satisfied by any classical
correlation but is violated when the correlation is obtained
from measuring entangled quantum states. Such inequalities
are called Bell inequalities.
An important example of such a Bell inequality was
proposed by Clauser, Horne, Shimony, and Holt (CHSH) [3]
and states that ifX andY are independent uniformly distributed
bits and if bitA is obtained by “processing”X without knowing
Y and bit B is obtained by “processing” Y without knowing
X, then the probability that A ⊕ B = X ∧ Y is at most 75%.
This bound on the probability holds if the processing is
done classically with shared randomness but can be violated
when the processing involves measuring an entangled quantum
state; in this latter case, a probability of roughly 85% can be
achieved.
Violating a Bell inequality necessarily means that there
must be some amount of fresh randomness in the outputs A
and B (given the inputs X and Y ). More formally, consider an
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untrusted deviceD, prepared by an adversarial manufacturer
Eve. The device consists of two components, set up by
Eve, which on respective inputs X and Y produce respective
outputs A and B without communicating. No matter how the
two components work, as long as a given Bell inequality is
violated during n sequential interactions with D (which can
be observed by doing statistics), there must be a certain amount
of uncertainty in the n output pairs (A1,B1), . . . ,(An,Bn), even
given the n input pairs (X1,Y1), . . . ,(Xn,Yn), and thus it should
be possible to apply a randomness extractor to obtain nearly
random bits.
This kind of randomness expansion from untrusted devices
was first suggested by Colbeck [4] and Colbeck and Kent
[5], who presented a scheme that uses Greenberger-Horne-
Zeilinger (GHZ) states and reaches a linear expansion, but
without providing a rigorous security analysis. The main point
missing in these works is a method to rigorously bound
the min-entropy of a device’s output. The work of Pironio
et al. [6] addresses this issue, and they propose a technique to
numerically compute a lower bound on the min-entropy of the
output pair AB (conditioned on X and Y ) as a function of the
Bell value of the deviceD (which quantifies the violation of
Bell inequality). For the special case of CHSH, they also show
an analytical bound.
The authors of [6] also consider the case of n sequential
interactions with D, and they show how to estimate the
average Bell value of D over n rounds by doing statistics
over the observed data. This is nontrivial because the Bell
value of D may change over the different rounds, and for
each round, it may depend on the behavior of the previous
rounds. In other words, the Bell value ofD during round i + 1
depends on the history (A1,B1,X1,Y1), . . . ,(Ai,Bi,Xi,Yi).
Pironio et al. then claim to have a bound on the min-entropy
012335-11050-2947/2013/87(1)/012335(8) Published by the American Physical Society
SERGE FEHR, RAN GELLES, AND CHRISTIAN SCHAFFNER PHYSICAL REVIEW A 87, 012335 (2013)
of (A1,B1), . . . ,(An,Bn) conditioned on (X1,Y1), . . . ,(Xn,Yn),
where the bound is actually a function of the observed data,
i.e., a function of (A1,B1,X1,Y1), . . . ,(An,Bn,Xn,Yn).
However, the claimed bound in [6] does not hold in general;
there is a flaw in its derivation, which is without an obvious
fix.1 Thus, even though the necessary tools are provided in
[6], they are not put together in the right way to be able to
control the min-entropy of (A1,B1), . . . ,(An,Bn) produced by
an untrusted deviceD.
B. Our result
In this paper, we make up for this shortfall in [6].
Specifically, we put together the tools provided in [6] in
order to obtain a correct bound on the min-entropy of
(A1,B1), . . . ,(An,Bn), conditioned on (X1,Y1), . . . ,(Xn,Yn),
by means of the observed data. The trick is to consider
and bound the min-entropy conditioned on the event that the
estimator for the average Bell value lies in some interval. This
gives us some control over the average Bell value of the device
but, as we show, still leaves enough uncertainty in the data to
get a good bound on its min-entropy.
We also address the question of the composability of
untrusted devices. We show that under the assumption that
different devices are not entangled, the output of one device,
after privacy amplification, can be used as the input for a
second device, and the resulting output of the second device,
after privacy amplification, can again be fed into the first device
and so on. Using an extractor with a short seed to do the privacy
amplification, this allows for a superpolynomial randomness-
expansion scheme using two untrusted (but guaranteed to be
unentangled) devices.
C. Concurrent and related work
In concurrent and independent work, Vazirani and Vidick
[7] as well as Pironio and Massar [8] came up with results that
overlap with ours. We briefly discuss here the similarities and
the differences between our results and those of Vazirani and
Vidick and of Pironio and Massar. We encourage the reader to
also look at the comparisons given in [7,8].
Vazirani and Vidick obtain a randomness-expansion
scheme with superpolynomial expansion and security against
quantum side information. We do not achieve security
against quantum side information, and our superpolynomial
randomness-expansion scheme requires two unentangled de-
vices in an iterative way, whereas their scheme works with just
one single device. On the other hand, their result is tailored
to CHSH, while our result is generic and holds for any Bell
1As a matter of fact, the formal statement is already suspicious since
the min-entropy is a fixed number, determined by the underlying
probability distribution, whereas the claimed bound is a random
variable. This is like saying that we can lower bound the min-entropy
of throwing a fair die by the result of the throw. The former equals
log2(6) ≈ 2.6, whereas the latter is a random number in {1, . . . ,6}.
We also point out that trying to bound the min-entropy conditioned on
the observed outcome makes no sense either because this conditional
min-entropy obviously vanishes.
inequality. Pironio and Massar’s results, on the other hand, are
very similar to ours and only differ in some minor details.2
In a very recent paper, Barrett et al. point out the possibility
of Trojan-horse attacks on device-independent randomness-
expansion protocols (see the Supplemental Material of [9]). It
seems impossible to prevent Eve from programming devices
(that are used multiple times) to release in later rounds
information about previous outputs. We note that although
such an attack seems unavoidable, in a single activation of
our randomness-expansion scheme (see Sec. IV for details),
we can reuse the same devices over and over again and still
prevent such a Trojan-horse attack by only releasing the output
of the very last round (and aborting if things go wrong before
the last round is reached).
II. PRELIMINARIES
We assume the reader is familiar with quantum information
processing, and we merely fix our notation and some basic
concepts in this section.
A. Quantum states
The state of a quantum systemA is given by a density matrix
ρA, i.e., a positive-semidefinite trace-1 matrix acting on some
Hilbert space HA. We denote the set of all such matrices,
acting onHA, by D(HA). The state space of the joint quantum
systems AB, which consist of two (or more) subsystems A
and B, is given by the tensor product HAB = HA ⊗HB. If
the state of the joint system is given by ρAB, then the state
of subsystem A when considered as a “stand-alone” system is
given by the reduced density matrix ρA = trB(ρAB) ∈ D(HA),
obtained by tracing out system B.
A random variable X over a finite set X with probability
distribution PX can be represented by means of the density
matrix as ρX =
∑
x PX(x)|x〉〈x| ∈ D(HX), where {|x〉}x∈X
forms a basis of HX = C|X|. Thus, we may view X as a
quantum system, and we say that its state,ρX , is classical. If the
state of a quantum system E depends on the random variable
X, in that the state of E is given by ρxE ∈ D(HE ) if X = x, then
we can view the pair XE as a bipartite quantum system in state
ρXE =
∑
x PX(x)|x〉〈x| ⊗ ρxE ∈ D(HX ⊗HE ). This naturally
extends to multiple random variables and quantum systems.
The distance between two states ρE ,ρ˜E ∈ D(HE ) is mea-
sured by their trace distance 12‖ρE − ρ˜E‖1, where ‖ · ‖1 is the
L1 norm.
3 In case of classical states ρX and ρ˜X, corresponding
to distributions PX and ˜PX, the trace distance coincides with
the statistical distance 12
∑
x |PX(x) − ˜PX(x)|.
B. Closeness to uniform, min-entropy, and extractors
In the following definitions, we consider a bipartite system
XE with classical X, given by ρXE . X is said to be random
2As a historical note, previous versions of their paper and our paper
claimed security against quantum side information, but both proofs
were incorrect.
3Defined by ‖A‖1 := tr(
√
A†A), where A† denotes the Hermitian
transpose.
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and independent from E if ρXE = ρU ⊗ ρE , where ρU is the
fully mixed state on HX (i.e., U is classical and, as a random
variable, uniformly distributed).
Definition 1. The distance to uniform of X given E is
d(X|E) := 12‖ρXE − ρU ⊗ ρE‖1.
If  is some event, determined by the random variable X,
then d(X | E,) is naturally defined by means of replacing
the distribution PX by PX|. The same applies to the next two
definitions.
Definition 2. The guessing probability of X given E is
Guess(X | E) := sup
{Mx }x
∑
x
PX(x)tr
(
Mx ρ
x
E
)
,
where the supremum is over all positive operator-valued
measures {Mx}x on HE .
Definition 3. The min-entropy of X given E is
Hmin(X | E) := − log2 Guess(X | E).
This definition was shown in [10] to coincide with the
definition originally introduced by Renner [11], which also
coincides with the classical definition of conditional min-
entropy in the case where E is classical.
Definition 4. A function Ext : {0,1}n × {0,1}d → {0,1}ξ
is a (k,εext)-strong extractor if, for any bipartite quantum
system XE with classical X and with Hmin(X | E)  k
and for a uniform and independent seed Y , we have
d(Ext(X,Y ) ∣∣ YE)  εext .
Note that we find “extractor against quantum adversaries”
too cumbersome a term; thus we just call Ext a (strong)
extractor, even though it is a stronger notion than the standard
notion of a (strong) extractor.
C. Bell inequality and CHSH
For given finite sets A,B,X,Y , consider a conditional
probability distribution PAB|XY , specified as follows. There
exists ρAB ∈ D(HA⊗HB) for an arbitrary (finite) dimensional
two-partite quantum systemAB and families of measurements
{Max } and {Nby }, indexed by x ∈ X and y ∈ Y , acting on A
and B, and with measurement outcomes a ∈ A and b ∈ B,
respectively, such that
PAB|XY (a,b | x,y) = tr
[(
Max ⊗ Nby
)
ρAB
(
Max ⊗ Nby
)†]
for all (a,b,x,y) ∈ A× B ×X× Y .
Definition 5. For any set C = {cabxy} of Bell coefficients,
the Bell value of PAB|XY (with respect to C) is defined as
I (PAB|XY ) =
∑
abxy
cabxyPAB|XY (a,b | x,y).
PAB|XY is called classical (or local) if there exist (condi-
tional) probability distributions PR , PA|XR , and PB|YR such
that
PAB|XY (a,b | x,y) =
∑
r
PR(r)PA|XR(a | x,r)PB|YR(b | y,r)
for all a,b,x,y; this is equivalent to requiring that PAB|XY
can be specified by means of a separable state ρAB. We let
I0 denote the maximal Bell value achievable (for a given
set of Bell coefficients) with a classical PAB|XY . We speak
of a violation of Bell inequality if there exists a quantum
system resulting in conditional probability distribution with
a Bell value greater than I0. For instance, for so-called CHSH
Bell coefficients [3], given by cabxy = (−1)xy(−1)a⊕b for
a,b,x,y ∈ {0,1}, it is known that I0 = 2, but I = 2
√
2 is
possible for a quantum system.
III. FRESH RANDOMNESS FROM UNTRUSTED DEVICES
In this section, we recall (some of) the findings of [6]
and also discuss and fix some subtle issue not discussed
there. Throughout this and the following sections, we consider
fixed finite sets A,B,X,Y and a fixed set C = {cabxy} of Bell
coefficients. The reader may think of CHSH, but our results
hold generally.
A. A single interaction
We consider an untrusted device D, prepared by an
adversary Eve. As discussed in the Introduction, D consists
of two components, which, on respective inputs x ∈ X and
y ∈ Y , produce respective outputs a ∈ A and b ∈ B without
communicating.4 Formally, D’s behavior is given by an
unknown conditional probability distribution PAB|XY , which is
specified by an unknown quantum state ρAB ∈ D(HA ⊗HB)
of unknown dimension and unknown families of measure-
ments {Max } and {Nby }, acting on the respective systems A and
B. We are interested in the guaranteed amount of uncertainty
in A and B (conditioned on X and Y ) under the promise
that PAB|XY has some given Bell value greater than I0. This
motivates the following definition.
Definition 6. For a given set of Bell coefficients, we define
h0 to be the function
h0(I ) = infHA ,HB ,ρAB
{Max },{Nby }
min
x∈X
y∈Y
Hmin(AB | X=x,Y =y),
where the outer infimum is over all finite-dimensional
Hilbert spaces HA and HB, all states ρAB ∈ D(HA ⊗HB),
and all families of measurements {Max } and {Nby } such that
PAB|XY (a,b | x,y) = tr(Max ⊗ Mby ρAB Max † ⊗ Mby †) has a
Bell value of at least I . Also, we define h to be the convex
closure of h0, i.e., the maximal convex function that does not
exceed h0.5
Pironio et al. [6] show that by means of a hierarchy
of semidefinite programs (SDPs) [12,13], h0(I ) can be
numerically computed up to arbitrary precision (by means
of a possibly expensive computation). They also show an
analytical lower bound of 1 − log2(1 +
√
2 − I 2/4) for h0(I )
in the case of CHSH, which reaches 1 for I = Imax = 2
√
2
[whereas the numerical calculation givesh0(2
√
2) ≈ 1.23] and
monotonically decreases to 0 as I goes down to I0 = 2; see
Fig. 2 in [6]. Since this lower bound is convex, it is also a
4The results derived here apply also to devices with three or more
components, including the three-component devices used in [5].
5Formally, h(I ) = max f (I ), where the maximum is over all convex
functions f , which are upper bounded by h0.
012335-3
SERGE FEHR, RAN GELLES, AND CHRISTIAN SCHAFFNER PHYSICAL REVIEW A 87, 012335 (2013)
lower bound on h; we will need this later on.6 For now, we
can conclude that if an unknown bipartite quantum system
(with fixed measurements {Max } and {Nby }) is promised to
have a CHSH value of I = 2√2, then the joint min-entropy
in the measurement outcomes A and B is lower bounded by
approximately 1.23 bits (one bit if one wants to rely on the
analytical bound).
B. Sequential repetitions
In order to get more uncertainty and in order to be able to
estimate the Bell value, we consider a sequential repetition of
extracting uncertainty from an untrusted device D as above.
Informally, rather than interacting withD once [i.e., inputting
(x,y) ∈ X× Y and observing (a,b) ∈ A× B], we interact
withD n times in sequence by inputting (x1,y1) ∈ X× Y and
observing (a1,b1) ∈ A× B, inputting (x2,y2) ∈ X× Y and
observing (a2,b2) ∈ A× B, etc. This procedure is formalized
as follows.
a. Modeling. We consider an arbitrary but fixed bi-
partite state ρAB ∈ D(HA⊗HB) of an arbitrary finite-
dimensional bipartite quantum system AB and a sequence
of n arbitrary but fixed pairs of families of measurements
({Ma1x1 },{Nb1y1 }), . . . ,({Manxn },{Nbnyn }).
For each pair, {Majxj } is a family of measurements, indexed
by xj ∈ X, acting on A, with measurement outcomes aj ∈ A;
similarly, {Nbjyj } is a family of measurements acting on B. We
allow the two components of the device D to communicate
between rounds; this is captured by a sequence U2, . . . ,Un
of unitary transformations acting on HA ⊗HB, where Uj is
applied to the (collapsed) state before the j th interaction. For
j ∈ {1, . . . ,n}, denote with aj the concatenation of the first
j rounds aj = a1 · · · aj and do the same for b,x, and y. Let
Aj,Bj ,Xj ,Y j be the corresponding random variables. To ease
notation, we use bold letters as shortcuts for the concatenation
of all n rounds, e.g., a = an,A = An, etc.
Formally, the conditional probability distribution PAB|XY
is defined as
PAB|XY (a,b | x, y) =
n∏
j=1
PAjBj |XjYj Tj (aj ,bj | xj ,yj ,tj ), (1)
where Tj = (Aj−1,Bj−1,Xj−1,Y j−1) and tj = (aj−1,bj−1,
xj−1,yj−1) denote the transcripts up to round j − 1, and
PAjBj |XjYj Tj (aj ,bj | xj ,yj ,tj )
= tr[(Majxj ⊗ Nbjyj ) ρAB|Tj=tj (Majxj ⊗ Nbjyj )†], (2)
where ρAB|Tj=tj is inductively defined for j = 1, . . . ,n as
follows. ρAB|T1=t1 = ρAB, and for 1  j < n,
ρAB|Tj+1=tj+1
= Uj+1
(
M
aj
xj ⊗ Nbjyj
)
ρAB|Tj=tj
(
M
aj
xj ⊗ Nbjyj
)†
PAjBj |XjYj Tj (aj ,bj | xj ,yj ,tj )
U
†
j+1 (3)
6Actually, the numerical computations for CHSH suggest that h =
h0; we do not know if this holds generally.
is the state obtained by applying Uj+1 to the state to which
ρAB|Tj=tj collapses when A and B are measured by {Majxj } and
{Nbjyj }, respectively, and aj and bj are observed.
What is important to realize is that before every round j , the
situation is exactly as in Sec. III A, with a fixed state ρAB|Tj=tj
and fixed measurements {Majxj } and {Nbjyj } in the deviceD, and
thus PAjBj |XjYj Tj (·, · | · , · ,tj ) here behaves as PAB|XY does in
Sec. III A.
We would like to point out that there is no need to
make {Majxj } (or {Nbjyj }) dependent on previous inputs and
outputs, i.e., on tj using the above notation, because we
may assume that the measurement {Majxj } encodes xj and aj
into the postmeasurement state of A and that the subsequent
unitary Uj+1 copies this (classical) information into the state
of B. The subsequent measurements can then be control
measurements, which perform a measurement depending
on the history. Similarly, we may assume the {Majxj } to be
identical for different j (and the same for {Nbjyj }) since the
quantum system A may maintain a counter that is increased
by every unitary Uj , and {Majxj } can then be chosen as a
control measurement that is controlled by the counter.7 Given
the conditional probability distribution PAB|XY as specified
above, which describes the input-output behavior of the n
sequential interactions with the deviceD, once a distribution
PXY is decided upon, which specifies how the inputs xj and
yj are chosen in each round, the joint probability distribution
PABXY is determined as PABXY = PXYPAB|XY .
b. Estimating the Bell value. Once the device D is
given, i.e., the state ρAB, the measurements ({Ma1x1 },{Nb1y1 }),
. . ., ({Manxn },{Nbnyn }), and the unitaries U2, . . . ,Un are fixed,
PA1B1|X1Y1 and thus the Bell value of the first round of
interaction, I1 = I (PA1B1|X1Y1 ), are determined. For the other
rounds, this is slightly more subtle. The reason is that the state
ρAB|T2=t2 before the second round, and thus the probability
distribution PA2B2|X2Y2,T2=t2 , depends on what happened in
the first round, i.e., depends on t2 = (a1,b1,x1,y1). Thus, the
Bell value of the second round, I2 = I (PA2B2|X2Y2,T2=t2 ), is
a function of t2. Similarly, the Bell value of the j th round,
Ij = I (PAjBj |XjYj ,Tj=tj ), is a function of tj . We let
¯I = 1
n
n∑
j=1
Ij (4)
be the average Bell value, averaged over n rounds, and we
write ¯I = ¯I (a,b,x, y) to make its dependency on the a, b, etc.,
explicit.8
Pironio et al. show in [6] that the average Bell value ¯I can
be estimated by analyzing the data collected over n rounds.
7These observations on the independence of the measurements on
the history and the round are not crucial for our proofs; they merely
simplify the notation.
8Actually, it only depends on (an−1,bn−1,xn−1,yn−1).
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Specifically, defining
ˆI = ˆI (a,b,x, y)
= 1
n
n∑
j=1
∑
abxy
cabxy
χ (aj = a,bj = b,xj = x,yj = y)
PXY (x,y)
, (5)
where χ (e) is the indicator of the event e [that is, χ (e) = 1 if
the event e occurs and 0 otherwise], the following proposition
holds.
Proposition 1 [6]. For ¯I and ˆI as above, for arbitrary but
identically and independently distributed (iid) (X,Y ), meaning
that PXY =
∏
j PXjYj with PXjYj = PXY for all j , and for any
ε > 0,
P [ ¯I (A,B,X,Y )  ˆI (A,B,X,Y ) − ε]
 exp
(
− ε
2n
2
(
cmax
pmin
+ Imax
)2
)
,
where Imax is the maximal value of I achievable by means
of a quantum system, pmin = minx,y PXY (x,y), and cmax =
max{cabxy}.
Thus, except with small probability, the estimated value ˆI
for the average Bell value is not much smaller than the real
average Bell value ¯I . For a fixed choice of Bell coefficients C =
{cabxy}, which uniquely determines Imax, we write c(pmin) =
1
2 ln 2 ( cmaxpmin + Imax)−2, so that the probability in Proposition 1
can be written as 2−c(pmin)ε2n.
We stress that for Proposition 1 to hold, it is crucial that X
and Y are chosen independently of the internal state ofD; this
is implicit in the statement of Proposition 1 by having modeled
the internal state ρAB ofD to be fixed and independent of X
and Y : ρXYAB = ρXY ⊗ ρAB. Obviously, if D knows X and
Y in advance, then it can easily be programmed to have a large
Bell value while, for instance, being classical.
c. Bounding the min-entropy. It remains to argue that if ¯I
is nontrivial, i.e., sufficiently greater than I0, which can be
learned by observing ˆI (except with small probability), then
the pair (A,B) contains a linear (in n) amount of min-entropy.
To this end, Pironio et al. show [see Eq. (A5) in [6]] that
PAB|XY (a,b | x, y)  2−h( ¯I (a,b,x, y)n) (6)
for all a,b,x, y. In the derivation, they use the fact that h
is convex. From (6), they conclude [see Eq. (A9) in [6]]
that Hmin(AB | X = x,Y = y)  nh( ¯I ) and thus  nh( ˆI − ε)
except with small probability. However, this conclusion does
not seem correct. What follows from (6) is that
Hmin(AB | X = x,Y = y)  nh
(
¯I
(
an0 ,b
n
0 ,x, y
)) (7)
for the values an0 and bn0 that minimize the right-hand side of
(7), but then the right-hand side of (7) is likely to be smaller
than nh( ¯I (a,b,x, y)) or nh( ˆI (a,b,x, y)) for the values a and b
actually observed.9
For the remainder of this section, we propose and discuss a
possible way to get a meaningful and useful statement on the
min-entropy of (A,B) in terms of h( ¯I ) and thus of h( ˆI ) except
9We note that the authors of [6], in a work independent of ours [8],
fix this issue in a similar manner as we do here.
with small probability. We partition the interval [I0,Imax] ⊂ R,
ranging from the trivial, meaning classical, Bell value I0 to the
maximal value Imax, into m disjoint blocks: [I0,Imax] = 0 ∪
· · · ∪ m−1, where  is of the form  = [J,J+1), with the
exception that m−1 = [Jm−1,Imax] for some boundary points
I0 = J0  J1  · · ·  Jm−1  Imax. The value of m ∈ N and
the (possibly different) sizes of  are arbitrary but fixed.
For any parameter ε > 0, given the random variables
A,B,X,Y , describing the n interactions with the device D,
we can now define the random variable Lε to be the unique
random variable that satisfies ˆI (A,B,X,Y ) − ε ∈ Lε (with
natural adjustments outside of the range [I0,Imax]).10
Theorem 1. Let (X,Y ) be iid. Then, for any ε, δ > 0, there
exists a “good” event G with
P [G]  1 − m2−δn − 3(2−c(pmin)ε2n),
such that
Guess(AB | X = x,Y = y,Lε =,G)  2−nh(J)+δn+1
and thus
Hmin(AB | X = x,Y = y,Lε =,G)  nh(J) − δn − 1
for all x ∈ Xn, y ∈ Y n, and  ∈ {0, . . . ,m − 1} with
PXYLε |G(x, y,) > 0.
We would like to point out that for the bound on P [G]
to hold, it is crucial that ρAB is independent of (X,Y ) [and
(Xi,Yi) are iid]: clearly, the device can fool you if it knows the
inputs it will get in advance. However, for event G as defined
in the proof below, the bound on the guessing probability
holds irrespective of the distribution of X and Y . Indeed, the
value of Guess(AB | X = x,Y = y,Lε =,G) is determined by
the conditional probability distributionPAB|XY (·, · |x, y) alone
(which is determined by ρAB, the family of measurements
and the unitaries); this holds because Lε as well as G (we
will see this below) are uniquely determined by A,B,X ,
and Y .
Proof. Let Bguess be the bad event ¯I (A,B,X,Y ) 
ˆI (A,B,X,Y ) − ε where the estimated Bell value ˆI is sig-
nificantly larger than the average Bell value ¯I , and let Gguess
be its complement (which we understand as a good event); by
Proposition 1, we know thatP [Bguess]  2−c(pmin)ε2n. We define
B1 to be the set of all “bad inputs” (x, y) with the property
P [Bguess|X = x,Y = y]  12 ; (8)
it is straightforward to show that P [(X,Y ) ∈ B1] 
2(2−c(pmin)ε2n). Finally, we define B2 to be the set of all (x, y,)
with the property
PLε |XYGguess (|x, y)  2−δn . (9)
It follows from the definition of B2 that
P [(X,Y ,Lε) ∈ B2|Gguess]  m2−δn.
We slightly abuse notation and identify the set B1 with the
bad event (X,Y ) ∈ B1, and we write G1 for its complementary
10The definition of Lε simply captures that if ˆI is too close to the
lower end of an interval, then we take the next lower interval to be on
the safe side.
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good event and correspondingly for B2 and G2. We now define
the good event G as G := Gguess ∧ G1 ∧ G2. Using the union
bound over the bad events, it is not too hard to show that
P [G]  1 − m2−δn − 3(2−c(pmin)ε2n).
It remains to argue the bound on the min-entropy. Let
a,b,x, y be such that ¯I (a,b,x, y) > ˆI (a,b,x, y) − ε; i.e., they
have positive probability conditioned on the good event Gguess.
Furthermore, let  be the unique value with
ˆI (a,b,x, y) − ε ∈ .
If (x, y) ∈ B1, then P [Gguess|X = x,Y = y]  12 , and hence,
conditioning on the event Gguess can increase the probabilities
by at most a factor of 2. For those (x, y) ∈ B1, it then follows
from (6) that
PAB|XY ,Gguess (a,b | x, y)  2(2−nh( ¯I (a,b,x, y)))
 2(2−nh( ˆI (a,b,x, y)−ε))
 2(2−nh(J)) . (10)
If additionally we have (x, y,) ∈ B2, then
PAB|XYLε,Gguess (a,b | x, y,) 
PAB|XY ,Gguess (a,b | x, y)
PLε |XYGguess ( | x, y)
 2(2−nh(J))(2δn) . (11)
Note that additionally conditioning on G1 and G2 does
not change the above conditional probability distribution if
(x, y) ∈ B1 and (x, y,) ∈ B2. Thus, the same bound also
applies to PAB|XYLε,G(a,b | x, y,) for all a,b,x, y, and 
with PABXYLε |G(a,b,x, y,) > 0. By definition of the guessing
probability and the min-entropy, this proves the claim. 
d. A specific example. Consider CHSH, so that the Bell value
of a given device is expected to be in the range from I0 = 2 to
Imax = 2
√
2 ≈ 2.828. Let us divide this range into J0 = I0 <
J1 = 2.2 < J2 = 2.4 < J3 = 2.6 < Imax, and let us take a q-
biased input distribution PXY =
∏
j PXjYj with PXjYj (0,0) =
1 − 3q and PXjYj (x,y) = q for all (x,y) ∈ {0,1}2 \ {(0,0)},
where 0 < q  1/4 is some parameter. Finally, let us fix some
small parameters ε,δ > 0; for concreteness, say that ε = 0.05
and δ = 0.01.
Consider now n sequential interactions with an untrusted
device D, where in each round xj and yj are chosen
(according to PXjYj ) and input into D, and aj and bj are
obtained as output fromD. Let us say that from the collected
data, we get ˆI (a,b,x, y) = 2.7 ∈ 3 as the estimation for
the average Bell value. By Theorem 1, we have that, given
x and y and Lε = 3, the min-entropy of a and b is at
least n[h(2.6) − δ] − 1 ≈ n(0.36 − δ) > n/3 bits, except with
probability 4(2−δn) + 3(2−c(q)ε2n).11 Thus, when applying a
suitable randomness extractor to a,b, we can extract, say, n/4
bits that are exponentially close to uniformly distributed (given
x and y and Lε = 3).
In order to sample the inputs according to the biased
input distribution PXY , as suggested in [6], it is known to
be sufficient (on average) to have access to nO(q log2(1/q))
11This probability is an average value over A B, X Y .
random bits [14]. Since q log2(1/q) converges to 0 for q → 0,
if q is chosen to be a small enough constant, then, say, n/4
random bits are sufficient. Thus, by starting off with n/4
random bits, we obtained another n/4 almost-random bits and
thus hold now n/2 random bits.12 Thus, we have expanded the
randomness by a factor 2. Choosing q = O(n−1/3), one obtains
an expansion factorO(n2/3/ log2 n) while still being negligibly
close to perfect randomness [since c(n−1/3) = (n−2/3)].
Having generated fresh randomness from an untrusted
device D, one is now tempted to use the newly obtained
randomness to generate even more fresh randomness from
the device D and so on. This does not work. The reason is
that the generated randomness is not random to the device
D, or, more formally, not independent of the internal state of
D; indeed,D has already observed x and y, and it has itself
produced a and b. We argue below, however, that we can use
the fresh randomness to generate even more randomness from
another device, as long as the devices are not entangled with
each other or with the adversary.
e. Classical side information. The case where the adversar-
ial producer of the devices Eve holds classical side information
about the device D can be reduced to the case without side
information by conditioning on particular values of the side
information.
f. Quantum side information? Ideally, one would like to
obtain similar results in the case where Eve holds quantum
side information about the deviceD, i.e., where Eve maintains
a quantum state E that is entangled with state AB contained
in D. It is not too hard to see that if the function 2−h(·) is
concave (which is, e.g., satisfied for CHSH), then the min-
entropy bound Hmin(AB|X = x,Y = y)  h(I ) for a single
interaction, which holds by definition of the function h,
extends to the case of quantum side information in that also
Hmin(AB|X = x,Y = y,E)  h(I ) holds, where I is the Bell
value of the distribution obtained by tracing out E . This
seems to suggest that quantum side information is useless
for Eve.
Unfortunately, the techniques we use for analyzing sequen-
tial repetitions do not appear applicable in the case of quantum
side information. The main technical problem we run into
is to show that a lower bound on the smooth min-entropy
of a random variable conditioned on a quantum state can be
obtained from a lower bound on the smooth min-entropy of the
random variable conditioned on the measurement outcome for
every possible measurement (as is the case for the nonsmooth
version [10]).13 It is not clear if such a statement is actually
true.
Thus, whether quantum side information is useless for Eve
also in the case of sequential repetition, where the average
Bell value is estimated from the observed data, remains an
open problem. We refer to [7] for a different proof technique
which does work against quantum side information.
12We are ignoring here the randomness needed for the extractor.
13Essentially, the notion of smooth min-entropy takes into account
that we may condition on a good event that has a probability close
to 1.
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Let ε, δ, e > 0 be the security parameters. Let t > 0 and assume long enough initial
randomness Kinit = (K0,KBank), split into parts of size |K0| = η and |KBank| = O(tη2 log2 η).
Denote the second part by KBank = S1 · · ·St where |S1| = · · · = |St| = O(η2 log2 η).
1. For i = 1 to t do:
(a) Set Ri = Sample (Ki−1).
(b) Input Ri to (i mod 2) and denote the output by Wi.
(c) Estimate the Bell value Iˆi of the ith interaction with the devices [Eq. (5)],
and determine the unique value i that satisfies Iˆi − ε ∈ Ωi
(d) Calculate the guaranteed min-entropy in Wi, Himin := ‖Wi‖(h(Ji)− δ)− 1,
and let ξi = Himin−4 log2 ε−1ext −cext, with a constant cext specified in Lemma 1.
(e) If ξi ≤ η, set Ki = Ki+1 = . . . = Kt = ⊥ (the empty string) and go to step 2.
Otherwise set Ki = Ext (Wi, Si) (with εext = 2−eη and ξi = |Ki|).
2. Output Kt.
FIG. 1. Randomness expansion scheme with two independent devices.
IV. COMPOSABILITY
Consider two (or more) untrusted devices D and D′,
prepared by the adversary Eve. We assume that D and D′
cannot communicate and are not entangled with each other.
The case when Eve holds classical side information about the
devices can be treated as described in the previous section.
We can then apply Theorem 1 to argue that the output AB
produced by D has high min-entropy (except with small
probability) given the internal state of D′ (because D′ is
independent of D), assuming that a large enough average
Bell value is observed. It thus follows that by applying an
extractor (with suitable parameters and a freshly chosen seed)
to AB, we obtain a bit string K that is close to random and
independent of the internal state of D′. This in particular
implies that if we use the randomness K to sample the input
X ′Y ′ toD′ (according to a prescribed distribution), then X ′Y ′
is close to independent of the internal state of D′. As the
dependency between the internal (quantum) state ofD and the
inputs and outputs ofD′ is purely classical, we can condition
on this classical information and apply Theorem 1 to argue that
the output A′ B′ produced byD′ has high min-entropy given
the current internal state ofD. Therefore, we are in the same
situation as above and so can use the randomness extracted
from A′ B′ to sample again inputs forD, and we can keep on
going like this as long as a large enough Bell value is observed.
We stress that the above line of reasoning only works because
we assumed the devicesD,D′ to be unentangled to start with.
A. Randomness expansion with independent devices
We increase the level of abstraction and from now on
consider an untrusted device D as an abstract object that
takes some input R = (X,Y ) = (Xn,Y n) and produces some
output W = (A,B) = (An,Bn) and maintains some internal
quantum state ED. It is guaranteed that, if R is properly
distributed and W satisfies some statistical property, then W
has lower-bounded min-entropy given R = r (except with
small probability), even given classical side information.
Let |R| denote the length of the bit string R, that is,
|R| = n log2 |X||Y | (similarly, |W | = n log2 |A||B|). Let
‖R‖ = n be the number of pairs (x,y) in R, that is, the number
of sequential interactions with the device caused by the input
R (respectively, ‖W‖ = n).
Instead of using v devices, our scheme alternates between
two devices D0,D1. Formally (Fig. 1), we split the initial
randomness Kinit into two parts Kinit = (K0,KBank) such that
|K0| = η and |KBank| = O(tη2 log2 η) for some constant t >
0. The first part K0 is used to generate an input to the devices,
and the other part KBank is used as a “bank” of t seeds for
the extractor. For i = 1, . . . ,t , let Ri denote the input given
to the device on the ith activation.14 For the first iteration, the
input is the biased string R1 = Sample(K0). Let Wi denote
the output of the ith activation. In order to generate the input
for the next iteration, Ri+1, we use an extractor on the bit
string Wi with a fresh random seed Si from the KBank. Denote
the extracted string by Ki = Ext(Wi,Si). Finally, Ki is used
to generate a biased string Ri+1 = Sample(Ki), which is the
input for the next iteration. Note that each iteration achieves
at most quadratic expansion; hence the strings Ri,Wi,Ki are
of length poly(η).
In order to extract randomness out of Wi , we use the
extractor of De et al. [15] with εext = 2−eη, where the constant
e > 0 is taken arbitrarily small.
Lemma 1 (Corollary 5.2 in [15]). There exists an extractor
Ext : {0,1}n × {0,1}d → {0,1}ξ which is
(ξ + 4 log2 ε−1ext + cext , εext)
strong against quantum adversaries, with cext = O(1) and a
seed of size d = O( log22(n/εext) log2 ξ ).
14We alternate between the devices; thus the ith activation is done
withD(i mod 2), which is also referred to as the ith device.
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The seed for the extractor is of length
O
(
log22(|Wi |/εext) log2 ξi
)
= O([ log22 poly(η) + e2η2] log2 poly(η))
= O(e2η2 log2 η). (12)
V. CONCLUSION AND OPEN PROBLEMS
An interesting extension to our result is to generalize
Theorem 1 to the setting of quantum side information. This
would allow a composition theorem for the more general case
in which the devices can be entangled with each other and with
Eve. Although we can allow quantum side information for a
single interaction with the device, we are currently unable
to give a rigorous proof of security against quantum side
information for multiple interactions and leave it as the main
open question.
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